The main tenet of the ill-fated Minsk agreements, along with the "special status", was the holding of local elections in the so-called "certain areas of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts" (CADLO).
Russia was interested in these elections, as they would legitimize its puppets as the official authorities in the region. This would allow moscow to influence all aspects of Ukraine's domestic and foreign policies through them.
Kyiv was also interested in the emergence of a legitimate authority in the CADLO, as this would return the region to Ukraine's legal framework and, accordingly, create opportunities for legal and financial leverage over it.
The stumbling block lay in the fact that the very text of the Minsk agreements contained a contradiction that blocked the electoral process in the "certain areas".
Specifically, point 9 of the "Package of Measures for the Implementation of the Minsk Agreements" stated: "the restoration of full control over the state border by the government of Ukraine throughout the conflict zone, which should begin on the first day after the local elections and be completed following a comprehensive political settlement..."
Such wording put the cart before the horse, as Kyiv could not control the territory where the elections were to be held without control over the border. This territory was dominated by illegal armed groups controlled by moscow. Accordingly, Ukrainian law enforcement and state bodies tasked with ensuring the legality of the electoral procedure could not operate there, nor could equal opportunities be created for all Ukrainian candidates, parties, and media outlets.
Moscow, for its part, insisted on Ukraine's "beginning" control over the border only on "the first day after the local elections", essentially pushing for elections to be held under the barrels of its guns, which made the participation of Ukrainian parties and media impossible.
The OSCE ODIHR election observation mission also could not send its observers to such elections if the state of Ukraine did not provide guarantees for their safety. And Kyiv, by definition, could not guarantee anything in a territory it did not control. The circle closed.
I won't delve into the intricacies of the so-called "Steinmeier Formula", supposedly aimed at resolving this dilemma—that's already history. What is important in the context of this article is that both the authorities and Ukrainian society quite reasonably perceived the idea of elections in the occupied territories under the control of the occupier as a threat to the state—that is, negatively.
Various analytical centers and Ukrainian politicians stated that elections in Donbas could only take place after de-occupation and a certain electoral "quarantine". For example, the first deputy head of the "Servant of the People" faction, Oleksandr Korniienko, said in December 2019 that local elections in the occupied territories of the Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts could only occur under Ukrainian legislation and after the withdrawal of russian troops from Donbas: "It will take time to implement all this. Starting from six months to nine months or a year—that's the minimum".
This is indeed the minimum period mentioned. Others suggested a timeframe for adapting the region to Ukraine's political process from one to three years after de-occupation. This paradigm became so ingrained in public consciousness that it continues to dominate even today, despite the drastically changed situation in both Donbas and the rest of Ukraine.
Some may argue that the issue seems so irrelevant now that there is no point in pondering it. Yet, just a year and a half ago, we were all waiting for the "spring counteroffensive" and the clearing of Ukraine from the enemy up to the 1991 borders, and the "three-year quarantine" paradigm had not been reconsidered. However, if the counteroffensive had yielded positive results, it could have significantly hindered the integration of the de-occupied territories.
Let me explain why. But first, let's discuss the changes that necessitate a shift from the "electoral quarantine" paradigm in the de-occupied territories.
Firstly, the model of de-occupation itself is changing. Previously, it was regulated by the Minsk agreements and was essentially imposed on us by russia in its interests. Today, however, the very fact of liberating the territories will signify moscow's defeat, thereby minimizing its ability to influence them. In other words, the "Trojan horse" factor of CADLO within Ukraine's political framework is no longer relevant. It will no longer exist.
Secondly, until 2022, both Kyiv and all our international partners considered only one path to de-occupation realistic—diplomatic pressure on moscow and concessions to it. This essentially meant the de facto preservation of the new pro-russian local "elites" formed in the "DNR"/"LNR" and merely a change of scenery for their "work". Naturally, this created psychological discomfort for Ukrainians and posed significant political risks for the country.
Now, the only realistic scenario for de-occupation is military. In other words, the territory will be liberated by someone with a weapon, and those who worked for the occupier are considered enemies and legitimate military targets. This means they will either have to flee to russia or die. They will not be able to participate in local elections. And even if some minor collaborators remain, they will become the focus of the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU) and law enforcement agencies, leaving them no time for elections. According to SBU officials consulted by the author on this matter, filtering the population in de-occupied territories will take, at most, two months.
Thirdly, until 2022, judging by the results of the 2019 parliamentary elections, the pro-russian electorate comprised approximately 20% of voters in Ukraine. This was a significant electoral niche, enabling local deputies to enter power from pro-russian parties like Opposition Platform — For Life. Today, the pro-russian agenda appeals to only 2–3% of Ukrainians, making it pointless to present it to the public. This is especially true in Eastern and Southern Ukraine, which have suffered the most from russia's military aggression.
As we can see, the conditions for holding elections in de-occupied territories before and after 2022 are fundamentally different. This means the election paradigm for these territories must also change.
Moreover, the Ukrainian state is now, on the contrary, interested in restoring democratic procedures in de-occupied territories as quickly as possible.
The primary reason for this is the need to bring people back to the towns and villages emptied by the war. This is a matter of economic development (a workforce, investments in reconstruction), social needs (returning internally displaced persons and ensuring they have living conditions), and political importance—the revival of Ukrainian lands destroyed by the enemy is the essence of victory in this war.
Moreover, the state is not just interested in repopulating the de-occupied regions but in attracting the most socially active and enterprising people from across Ukraine. These individuals would be able to drive both the economic renewal and the Ukrainization of the demographic profile of these oblasts. To achieve this, there will undoubtedly be the creation of free economic zones and incentive programs for those relocating or returning.
But who would move to devastation and minefields if they would find themselves not only in worse living conditions but also deprived of civil rights, unable to participate in elections or influence decisions of local authorities?
When it comes to nationwide elections, excluding residents of de-occupied territories would create an inaccurate political map of the country in parliament. The lack of a political mechanism to address disputes between the regions and the center would inevitably lead to social conflicts. Considering the amount of weaponry in civilian hands, these conflicts could escalate into armed confrontations. For the elites, elections are a means of redistributing state resources. For the people, they are a way to release pressure. Without this outlet, an explosion is possible, especially given that russia, unfortunately, isn’t going anywhere and would readily exploit such tensions.
All of this points to the fact that the state must, above all, be interested in the swift restoration of democratic procedures in the de-occupied territories. This includes, first and foremost, holding local and national elections alongside the rest of the country. Only this will create the conditions for forming inclusive social, political, and economic systems that will ensure not only recovery but also development.
If the de-occupied territories remain under the control of military administrations, with no opportunities for the public to effectively influence governance, and if economic and political processes are controlled from Kyiv (remaining inaccessible to the local/returned/relocated population), enterprising and motivated people simply will not move there. The region will increasingly marginalize and quickly become a literal "mined Wild Steppe".
War, destruction, and elements of civil conflict (following forced mobilizations in the "DNR"/"LNR" in 2022) have, objectively speaking, turned Donbas into what could be described, paraphrasing the Minsk agreements, as "special districts". Not "certain" as in the Minsk agreements, but special. Life there will be harder than in those parts of Ukraine that were not under prolonged occupation. Therefore, attracting people to these areas will require incentives. However, restricting rights, including voting rights, is not an incentive. On the contrary, in de-occupied territories, there should be more rights and opportunities, not fewer. And naturally, they should operate on the same political calendar as the rest of the country.
By Serhiy Harmash, President of the Center for Research on Donbas Social Perspectives