The Munich Security Conference, which lasted from February 14 to 16, brought many surprises and tough statements. According to its chairman, Christoph Heusgen, this year’s conference was "in a sense, a European nightmare" but also provided "a lot of clarity".
During his closing speech, the head of the security conference became emotional and cried. Billionaire and head of the U.S. Government Efficiency Department, Elon Musk, in his characteristic manner, called Christoph Heusgen "pathetic". Perhaps this image best reflects what transpired over three days in Munich.
"Donald Trump’s attack on Europe", summarizes The Economist regarding the conference's outcome. Many global media outlets, politicians, and experts gave similar or even harsher assessments.
Ukrainian political analyst and director of the Center of Applied Political Studies "Penta", Volodymyr Fesenko, shared his impressions of the Munich conference with OstroV, explaining why China’s voice was barely heard and where the negotiation process to end the war in Ukraine currently stands.
Munich conference
— What are your impressions of the Munich conference? Was it sensational?
— This year’s Munich Security Conference became one of the most high-profile and pivotal in its history. Many compare it to the 2007 conference when putin delivered his infamous speech, effectively declaring confrontation with the West. That speech was an ideological russian manifesto, and now we are witnessing something similar, though different in form.
The most alarming moment was the keynote speech by U.S. Vice President J.D. Vance, which contained criticism of European democracy. It essentially marks an ideological divide between the stance of the United States under Trump’s presidency (aggressive ideological neoconservatism) and Europe, with its traditionally liberal political forces.
There is a risk—one that many are already discussing—that the West, as a unified geopolitical entity, may become a thing of the past. Europe and the U.S. could, so to speak, become separate geopolitical actors. I don’t think this will happen immediately, or perhaps at all, but the risk exists if the U.S. continues on its current trajectory.
As long as institutions like NATO and the G7 exist, I believe there will be attempts to maintain this unity. But the fact that a deep ideological divide is emerging within the West has, unfortunately, become a reality, and this greatly concerns Europeans. In my opinion, this is not just a reaction to Vance’s speech; it also relates to Trump’s conversation with putin and the statements he has been making, particularly regarding the peace process in Ukraine. This also includes statements from the new U.S. Secretary of Defense. All of this gives Europeans cause for concern.
— In your opinion, has Europe drawn any conclusions?
— Yes, Europeans are beginning to realize that they need to consolidate and start taking action. In a way, after Trump’s victory, they tried to adapt to his policies, hoping there wouldn’t be any drastic changes. Now that feeling is fading, and they understand that they need to demonstrate unity—both in helping Ukraine and in defending their own interests.
As the Estonian foreign minister noted at one of the informal meetings, Europe needs to wake up, and they are starting to do so. On February 16, an emergency meeting of EU foreign ministers took place in Munich. The next day, a meeting of leaders from several European countries was held in Paris, organized by Macron. This meeting is being called an "emergency" and "crisis" summit because it addresses issues of aid to Ukraine, European unity in relations with the U.S., and challenges from russia.
And this brings us to another key topic at the Munich conference—the prospects for further peace efforts and ending the war in Ukraine.
— What caught your attention?
— This conference marks a turning point because, for the past three years, the focus has been on war. Now, they are talking about peace negotiations, but the question is how they are talking about them. Unfortunately, what many expected did not happen: the Americans did not present any concrete peace plan. Our president pointed this out, and other conference participants share this sentiment. While certain ideas and positions from the Americans were voiced, no specific peace plan has been put forward.
This is a problem, but an even bigger issue is that the Americans have made it clear that they do not currently see Europeans as part of the negotiation process. However, U.S. officials have confirmed that Ukraine was, is, and will be part of the negotiations.
There are no discussions about agreements excluding Ukraine. On the contrary, our country remains a participant and a subject in the negotiation process. The idea of negotiating behind Ukraine’s back or making deals without its involvement is not being considered at all. This is crucial. Ukraine is actively insisting on this position, emphasizing (and Europeans are confirming) that we will not accept any agreements about Ukraine without Ukraine.
— But the Americans don’t see Europe’s participation in the negotiation process right now?
— Yes, and that’s a problem. But the U.S. is not completely ruling out this possibility, as Special Representative Keith Kellogg noted at one of the luncheons. The entire discussion was focused on Europe’s involvement in the negotiations.
Keith Kellogg said that the U.S. is not excluding Europe from the negotiation process, but they see its structure in a very simple way: two warring countries—russia and Ukraine, and a mediator—the U.S. That’s it; no one else is needed. Europeans are not satisfied with this, especially since the Americans want to shift the responsibility for Ukraine’s security entirely onto Europe. If that’s the case, then Europe should be included in the negotiation process. This creates serious contradictions between the positions of the U.S. and Europe, and I believe this will become one of the key issues in negotiations between the U.S. and Europeans. Ukraine will also insist on Europe’s participation in the negotiation process.
In my opinion, these are the key discussion topics and issues that were addressed at the Munich conference. I have a feeling that this Munich could be a turning point. That doesn’t mean everything will change tomorrow. Just as the war against Ukraine didn’t start in 2007. But after putin’s speech, there was 2008, when, under pressure from russia, France and Germany blocked Ukraine and Georgia from receiving a Membership Action Plan for NATO. Then came russia’s war against Georgia, followed by the occupation of Crimea, the war in Donbas, and the full-scale aggression against Ukraine. All of this developed gradually. And the same is happening now. I think this conference has defined some key themes around which geopolitical processes will evolve, particularly within Europe. A lot depends on how and whether Trump’s attempt to persuade putin to agree to end the war in Ukraine will turn out. This issue remains open, and much depends on it.
Another important topic raised by our president, which could also be a turning point, is the issue of European security, specifically the creation of European armed forces. This is not a new topic. Macron has also raised it, but now Volodymyr Zelensky is emphasizing it in the context of future NATO-related developments. If the Americans reduce their role in Europe, if the American security umbrella weakens, then Europeans will need to defend themselves. They must create European armed forces, with Ukraine as part of them. I believe this process, this trend, is inevitable and will most likely begin after the war between russia and Ukraine ends. This could change the situation within NATO, where an autonomous European security segment might emerge, or possibly even something new, perhaps an alternative to NATO.
China’s role
— We’re talking about the U.S., Europe, and Ukraine, but what role is assigned to China in all of this? It seemed that Beijing’s voice was quite subdued in Munich. How did you perceive it?
— China doesn’t claim a loud role. Right now, the biggest loudspeaker is Trump and his administration, members of his team. They’re the ones speaking very loudly. As for China, it doesn’t speak loudly, but it moves steadily. In my opinion, what was discussed at this conference regarding China deserves attention. It’s not about volume but about their position. And this position is neither pro-russian nor pro-American. On the contrary, considering the problems between the West and russia, as well as the emerging tensions between the U.S. and Europe, China’s stance appears very constructive. And that’s not accidental.
The Chinese have sensed that now they can play on contrast and present a constructive position. Yes, it’s not always sincere because China can be aggressive and tough, but in this case, it demonstrates that it supports maintaining the international order and resolving problems in a non-confrontational manner. It has even called on everyone to calm down and not quarrel. China is now positioning itself in contrast to Trump and putin. It’s showing that it has a different approach from russia and does not intend to be a threat, at least to Europe.
— Why has China’s messaging started to target Europe?
— I think China is beginning to exploit the contradictions that are already emerging between the U.S. and Europe. China can use these contradictions for its own interests, specifically to weaken the restrictions currently imposed on it. If the U.S. imposes trade sanctions and restrictions against both China and Europe, Beijing and Brussels could join forces against the U.S. in a trade war. That’s why China didn’t speak loudly, but it was still noticeable at this conference.
— In your opinion, is China fighting for a seat at the negotiation table alongside the U.S., russia, Ukraine, and Europe?
— No, the Chinese are acting differently here as well. They are a backup player when it comes to the peace process. They haven’t abandoned their peace plan, but given the current situation, Trump’s active involvement, and the rapid pace of the negotiation process, the Chinese have stepped aside and are observing. Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi stated that they welcome Trump’s peace initiatives to end the war in Ukraine and are ready to support them. This is a hint that, if necessary, China could take part in the negotiation process.
As far as I know, Beijing is closely monitoring the negotiation process and is ready to join. It’s just a matter of when and how. I think that if the negotiation process initiated by Trump reaches a deadlock, China might step in and take the lead, seizing the initiative in the peace talks. Some European politicians are already considering this scenario, openly stating that if Trump fails, China could take center stage.
Beijing is in no hurry, maintaining a conservative stance, but at the same time, it remains nearby, carefully observing the situation. If necessary, China could join the negotiations or propose an alternative initiative.
— So, does that mean China might be interested in the failure of negotiations between Trump and putin?
— China isn’t interested in Trump achieving a quick and easy success in the negotiations because that would strengthen the global influence of the United States, which is already a challenge for Beijing. China doesn’t want the U.S. to grow stronger, especially given its aggressive policies. However, China is objectively interested in ending the war in Ukraine because it aims to preserve a unified global economy. It would be disadvantageous for China if international relations and trade became segmented—if a Western bloc formed, separate from russia and China, leaving them to trade only with each other. The main markets for China are Western countries, with nearly half of its exports going there. That’s why China is interested in de-escalating the current conflict and maintaining global trade and economic stability.
At the same time, ideologically and geopolitically, the U.S. and the West are competitors for China. Beijing is now positioning itself as one of the major centers of influence in modern international politics. China has no interest in Trump getting closer to putin, as that could threaten its interests. Instead, China plays on contradictions and might use a certain level of pluralism in international relations, striving to become a primary center of influence rather than just one among many.
I think China will now adapt to the new situation, observe Trump’s actions, and seek allies. There could be some rapprochement with Europe. Both the Chinese and Europeans might advocate for countering Trump’s protectionist foreign policy measures.
Negotiations on the war
— At what stage are we in the negotiation process to end the war in Ukraine?
— At the initial one. The peace talks themselves have not yet started; the preparatory process is underway. It is noticeable that the Trump administration is conducting separate negotiations: one with russia and another with Ukraine. I do not share the popular opinion in the West that the Americans have supposedly sidelined Ukraine from the negotiations and want to reach an agreement only with the russians. I see no signs of this. When people say that Ukraine has been excluded from the talks, that is simply not true. The U.S. is running a parallel negotiation process. They have formed two parallel negotiation groups. Keith Kellogg said he would be responsible for negotiations with Ukraine and Europe, while his colleague Steve Witkoff would handle talks with russia.
I think the U.S. vice president and treasury secretary will also take part in negotiations with Ukraine, as this relates to resource-related matters, which were of great interest at the Munich conference. Some expected this agreement to be signed, but that did not happen.
— In your opinion, was that the right decision?
— In my view, it was the right move for Ukraine not to sign what the U.S. proposed. This applies both to the content of the agreement and, more importantly, to the further negotiation process. The Americans need to see that we will not sign documents without discussion. Any negotiation document must be agreed upon by both sides before it can be signed. This will also be a topic of negotiations.
However, neither we nor the russians have negotiation teams dedicated to direct talks between us. The main negotiations, which should lead to the end of the war—those between russia and Ukraine—have not yet begun.
— Is that what the U.S. wants?
— The Americans want this to be the second stage of the negotiation process. After separate talks with the russians and Ukrainians, they aim to convince both sides to begin direct negotiations. The idea is to bring putin and Zelensky to the same negotiating table under Trump’s leadership to agree on a ceasefire.
Or, in my opinion, a more rational approach would be for delegations to first meet, hold discussions on general issues, and agree on a ceasefire. This is the logical sequence of the negotiation process as the Americans envision it.
— But the U.S. wants to first achieve a ceasefire and only then start peace talks…
— Yes, the Americans see the process as follows: first, agree on a ceasefire, and only then begin lengthy peace negotiations. That is their vision. The problem is that this idea does not appeal to putin. As Trump said after speaking with putin, russia is interested in a stable agreement, in a stable peace treaty.
The Americans also do not want a new "Minsk"; they strive for a stable and effective peace agreement. However, for the U.S., the priority is the swift end to the war, so that hostilities cease, and only after that can peace talks begin, which, of course, will not be quick or easy.
Russia is highly likely to agree to peace talks, but it is unlikely to agree to a ceasefire. They may simultaneously conduct negotiations and continue the war against Ukraine, as they did in 2014-2015. This is one of the key contradictions between the U.S. and russia’s positions, and there are many such contradictions, which complicates the swift achievement of agreements between Trump and putin.
— Do the Europeans believe in quick negotiations and a ceasefire?
— The vast majority of experts, including Western ones, are skeptical about the possibility of the quick implementation of Trump’s peace initiatives. Many believe that as long as russia has a military advantage, as long as russian troops continue, albeit slowly, their offensive in eastern Ukraine, russia is not interested in ending the war. This is the opinion shared by most experts, and there is a consensus among them.
Most European diplomats also believe that all of putin’s statements about his readiness for peace are cynicism and delusion. They do not believe in the sincerity of his intentions. For some reason, Trump believes putin because he wants to, but the Europeans do not. Therefore, they are skeptical about the prospect of a quick ceasefire.
— Do you think Trump will pressure putin on this issue?
— It’s possible, you can’t rule it out, but only if putin changes his position based on the logic of his own game with Trump. I don’t rule it out. But the more likely scenario is that russia’s military actions against Ukraine may continue alongside peace talks, and most European politicians and diplomats hold this view.
— Considering the political processes currently unfolding in the U.S. and especially in Europe, do you think we might see russian representatives in Munich a year from now?
— Probably not. Any disagreements in the approaches of the U.S. and russia will remain, even if there is some thaw in these relations, contacts resume, some negotiations take place, etc. It doesn’t mean that russian representatives will appear in Munich. Europeans will maintain their critical stance towards russia. The position of Europe, as some European politicians are already stating, is that russia cannot be part of the "G7", as Trump wishes. There may be fundamental disagreements between the U.S. and the EU regarding russia.
— Will this also concern sanctions policy?
— It’s quite possible. One of the problems could be the Americans’ idea of a gradual lifting of sanctions against russia. Fine, the Americans might agree to this, but what about the European sanctions? If Europe does not participate in the negotiation process, it is unlikely that the Europeans will quickly change their stance on russia and return it, in particular, to participation in the Munich conference.
If peace in Ukraine becomes permanent, if there is a gradual reduction in tensions between Europe and russia, perhaps in a few years, some russians, initially experts and not politicians, could appear in Munich. This could only happen if the cessation of hostilities lasts long-term. But I don’t expect this to happen next year. I don’t think the divide that emerged in 2022 will disappear in a year.
— And in the context of a possible shift of Europe "to the right"?
— It’s possible that we’ll see the rise of far-right forces in Europe, especially in some countries. This trend already exists. Moreover, it is very dangerous now that these populist far-right forces are consolidating within Europe itself. I would call this the creation of a new Black International. The U.S. is actively supporting this. This is evident from the statements and actions of Elon Musk. Some Western media outlets have calculated that he is actively supporting far-right forces in 18 countries across Europe. It is very important that he is providing informational support. Elon Musk is effectively acting as a lobbyist and propagandist for these political forces.
Unfortunately, Elon Musk isn’t the only one involved in this. The speech by U.S. Vice President could also be seen as support for these forces. What speaks volumes is that he met with the leader of "Alternative for Germany", and with Friedrich Merz (leader of the "Christian Democratic Union", a candidate for chancellor of Germany, ed.)—the communication was symbolic. In other words, the "Trumpists" are not hiding who their allies in Europe are. But once again, this will contribute to the growing opposition between the Americans and the Europeans.
— Do you believe that far-right forces could come to power in EU countries?
— In most European countries, far-right forces shouldn’t come to power. In Germany, they secured the position of the second most popular political force, getting around 20% of the vote in elections. But the most likely scenario now is that centrist forces and the "Greens" will be able to maintain the majority and form a coalition in Germany. That said, we’ve already seen far-right populist forces come to power in some countries, like the Netherlands, and even earlier in Italy.
By the way, in Italy, we see that while the domestic politics take a classic far-right position, externally, Rome remains a normal European country and supports Ukraine. This isn’t the same as Orban’s or Fico’s policies, even though they’re also far-right.
As for Austria, a far-right force won the election there, but they weren’t able to form a coalition, and now there’s a stalemate situation. The influence of the right-wing forces might increase in some countries. For example, in the Czech Republic, Andrej Babiš might return to power, his party also being moderate populists aligned with Trump. But they will likely have to form a coalition government.
Therefore, I do not expect any significant rightward shift in Europe. Right-wing forces may win in some countries, but overall, in the key major European countries, I think centrist forces will still dominate. Furthermore, a process of consolidation among centrist and moderate European forces advocating for the preservation of European values will begin.
Interviewed by Vladyslav Bulatchik, OstroV