After the negotiations between the U.S. and Ukraine in Jeddah on March 11, everyone is waiting for moscow’s reaction to Kyiv’s agreement there to take a 30-day pause in hostilities. Will putin agree to a temporary truce? And what dangers might the negotiation process with the U.S. pose for our country? We discuss this with former member of the Ukrainian delegation in the Minsk Trilateral Contact Group, Serhiy Harmash.
– Serhiy, how do you assess the negotiations between Ukraine and the U.S. in Saudi Arabia?
– It’s difficult to evaluate the results of the negotiations because we don’t actually know anything about them. Or rather, we only know what they wanted to show us. But we don’t know the underlying reasons—why exactly these decisions were made and why they are showing us only this. Based on my experience in the Minsk TCG, the most important things usually remain behind the scenes...
– What do you mean?
– Well, for example, before the negotiations, Trump’s advisor Witkoff stated that "the negotiation table will include security protocols for Ukrainians and territorial issues".
Meanwhile, President Zelensky said that the Ukrainian delegation would propose a truce in the air and at sea, but not on land.
As a result, we are being told about a 30-day truce along the entire front line, including on land, but not a word about "security protocols and territorial issues".
And this is happening against the backdrop of Ukrainian forces retreating from the Kursk oblast. Whether this was due to the threat of encirclement or the outcome of negotiations with the Americans (not the russians!) remains unclear. Could this be one of the "territorial issues"? But if that’s the case, and the Americans are deciding with Kyiv the fate of russian territory, then they likely have corresponding agreements with moscow. And if so, another logical question arises: is the American idea (as stated in the joint communiqué following the negotiations in Saudi Arabia) truly an American one, or is it actually a russian one?
It is noteworthy that the Americans proposed a ceasefire for a specific period—30 days. Previously, putin had repeatedly and publicly stated that russia would not agree to a short-term truce. And suddenly, such an obvious provocation from the U.S. Does this mean that Trump has abruptly stopped being "putin's friend", provoking him into a negative response to justify imposing new sanctions on russia? After all of the American autocrat’s courtesies toward his russian counterpart, that’s hard to believe. Moreover, Trump's interest in putin is far greater than his interest in Ukraine. All of this suggests that the "American initiative" for a 30-day truce is actually a russian one. Or at the very least, coordinated with moscow. Supporting this theory is the fact that the negotiations were led by Witkoff, who had previously traveled to moscow and has close contact with Kirill Dmitriev—one of putin's trusted associates.
– But you yourself pointed out that putin has repeatedly stated that a short-term truce is unacceptable for russia.
– Most likely, when putin spoke about the unacceptability of short-term truces, he didn’t mean a pause with clearly defined time limits, but rather a ceasefire in general, one that isn’t tied to any obligations from Ukraine and the U.S. to meet russia’s demands. A kind of ceasefire during negotiations, which could drag on for years. But a 30-day pause, especially in exchange for the withdrawal of Ukrainian forces from Kursk, is something moscow—exhausted in Donbas—could really use. And even if the agreement on Kursk is just a conspiracy theory, a pause wouldn’t hurt russia right now. After all, stopping hostilities for just 30 days provides an opportunity to regroup and regain strength. Another question is that, day by day, putin will try to delay the start of the ceasefire. He won’t agree to it immediately, at least not until he can make the withdrawal from Kursk look like his own victory rather than something imposed by the Americans. That’s probably why he suddenly went there and put on military fatigues. But refusing Trump outright? Unlikely.
– Should russia be trusted if a ceasefire agreement is reached? After all, since 2014, they have repeatedly violated truces in Donbas.
– Exactly! Why would putin publicly humiliate Trump by refusing when he could simply agree, present himself as a peacemaker, and then break the ceasefire anyway, while blaming Ukraine for it?
We are asking the wrong question entirely. Everyone is wondering whether putin will agree to a ceasefire. But we must understand that a ceasefire is never an end in itself. It is always a tool to achieve some other goal. Therefore, the main question for us is not “Will putin agree to a ceasefire?” but rather “WHY might he agree to a ceasefire?”
For example, during the Minsk negotiations, ceasefires were a tool for moscow to force Ukraine into recognizing the legitimacy of the CDDLO as a party to the conflict and as a negotiating side.
The russians used trickery and intense pressure to try to make us "coordinate" something with the CDDLO (in reality, the so-called "DNR"/"LNR"), to sign agreements, to conduct "joint inspections", etc.—all of which would have effectively recognized their legal subjectivity in Kyiv’s eyes. From a military or humanitarian standpoint, these ceasefires never meant anything to moscow! They were purely an instrument to grant subjectivity and legitimacy to its puppets!
Right now, I am certain it is the same story. Moscow may agree to a ceasefire, but not to save lives or to facilitate prisoner exchanges. It will do so only if there is a practical benefit. For example, to show Trump a willingness to engage in a peace process. Or to regroup its exhausted troops in Donbas. Or to secure the withdrawal of our forces from the Kursk oblast in exchange for their agreement to a 30-day pause. Or to create a pretext for its ally, Trump, to legitimately accuse Ukraine of disrupting the peace process, not only cutting off aid but also imposing sanctions...
– The second topic of the negotiations was an agreement on Ukrainian minerals. How do you assess this process?
– Take note: when the Americans flew to Saudi Arabia and were asked about the negotiations, they did not even announce this issue. That means it was already settled for them from the start. I believe this matter was decided for them even before February 28, when the historic confrontation between Zelensky and Trump-Vance took place. Back then, the signing of the agreement was simply postponed as part of the “disciplining” of Ukraine’s leadership. Then, military aid was cut off, intelligence-sharing was suspended (which, once again, weakened our positions in the Kursk oblast…). And as a result: reconciliation followed, Ukraine expressed readiness to negotiate with russia and to accept a ceasefire on the White House’s terms.
In this case, the Americans used the same tactics as the russians did during the Minsk process. If a problem arose that they couldn’t force through, they would simply create another problem and block the negotiations. Then, in order to unblock the talks, they would agree to a compromise on this new problem, while the original one—so as not to disrupt the "constructive dialogue"—would simply be forgotten. Like, "See? We made concessions, so now you must make concessions too".
The same thing happened this time. To reconcile with Washington after February 28 and to restore military aid, we had to agree to a ceasefire on land and God knows what else. I fear we will only find out after the fact. Meaning, when they saw Kyiv’s defiance, the U.S. created a problem for us, the resolution of which was exchanged for Ukraine falling in line…
That’s why the minerals agreement was never taken off the agenda. It is important to Trump. The real question is whether this agreement remains in the same version Zelensky took to Washington on February 28, or if the Americans rewrote it in a way that benefits them even more. I wouldn’t be surprised if they took advantage of our difficult situation here as well and decided to rob their helpless "partner".
– In your opinion, what red lines should Ukraine hold in negotiations with the Americans?
– On the issue of territory, under no circumstances should we agree to recognize the occupied territories as russian! In fact, there aren’t even any legal mechanisms for such a decision. At most, we could agree not to attempt to reclaim our territories by military means, but to renounce them—never, under any conditions! This is a question of our future. We won’t be here tomorrow, but Ukraine will remain. We cannot deprive our children of their land.
On the issue of minerals, we cannot recognize debts to the U.S. that we never took on when we were receiving aid under Biden. Retroactively changing the terms of agreements is unacceptable. This is, again, about our future. No one has the right to burden our children with a debt yoke. Especially since the U.S. has proven to be an unreliable partner. Tomorrow, Trump might dislike Zelensky’s behavior, tear up all the agreements, and become putin’s ally. And then what—will we end up helping putin with our minerals?
Today, it’s important to understand that there are no more friends in global politics. There are only alignments or misalignments of interests. There is no international law, no international institutions, only tactical alliances based on the alignment of interests. Therefore, any deals, especially with Trump, must be made based on this. This applies to war, politics, and the economy.
Today, there is only the law of the strong. The key mistake Zelensky made was seeking strength not in Ukraine, not with his people, but abroad, with the "West", "our partners", and so on. But the "West" no longer exists. We no longer know what NATO is or whether it will even exist. Partners, like Poland—today they’re partners, but tomorrow they could be adversaries. Therefore, all efforts today must be directed at finding resources within Ukrainian society, at building an alliance between the state and its citizens, so that they feel it is THEIR state and want to protect it!
Accordingly, all external agreements must be aimed at this. Sometimes it’s better to lose external support than to lose internal resources. Because the first is a temporary difficulty, and the second is an existential problem.
But! At the same time, we must consider our current level of dependence on the U.S. and other "partners" and strive to maintain good relations with them. And along the way, diversify these dependencies. Therefore, I can’t give harsh judgments about our negotiators with the U.S. They have no real choice. It’s better to make difficult concessions to those we depend on than to those we’re at war with. It’s a delicate balance.
By Vitaliy Krymov, OstroV